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PnoCEss-MisNOMER IN SuMMONS-.AMENDMENT-Plaintiff intended to sue
James Brago, but by mistake used the name "Joseph Brago" in the complaint and
summons. Joseph happened to be the name of intended defendant's brother.
Copies of process were left with James' wife, but as sister-in-law of Joseph who
resided elsewhere. When plaintiff realized the error, the statute of limitations
prevented his bringing a new suit. Plaintiff's motion to amend the summons
and complaint was granted. On appeal, held, order reversed so far as it purports
to amend the summons. Patrick v. Brago, 4 N.J. Super. 226, 66 A. (2d) 749
(1949).
The New Jersey statute applicable in the principal case authorized service of
process by leaving a copy at the individual's usual place of abode with some
member of his family over fourteen years of age then residing there.1 There
are really two problems involved in the case, sufficiency of service as meeting formal statutory requirements, and sufficiency of summons as a notice. The
New Jersey court held that James had never been served.2 Thus he was not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and amending the summons would not
cure the defect.3 The court evidently thought it did not have to decide whether
a misnomer of Joseph for James would in itself nullify a summons, but did

N.J. Laws (1948) c. 355, §l(a).
Process was left with a member of "the" family at "her" usual place of abode. See
the quotation from the sheriff's return, principal case at 750.
3 The court's approach is indicated on p. 750. 'We would have little difficulty in
affirming if we were satisfied ••• that James ••• had received a notice •••• We may surmise
that she showed the summons and complaint to James who recognized .•• he had been
involved. Perhaps he considered that he was actually the defendant, or pehaps he believed
that his brother was being sued by mistake. We cannot speculate on his mental processes•
• • • But the summons cannot be amended where the amendment would make the record
show that a person has been served and brought into court when actually he has not ••• or
even where it is doubtful whether he has been served."
1
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indicate by way of dictum that it would not.4 Yet it would seem that the misnomer was necessarily involved in the decision, for, absent the misnomer, the
service would clearly have been good. 5 In determining whether a particular error
in names is serious enough to be jurisdictional when the other specific requirements of service have been correctly followed, many courts have used the doctrine
of idem sonans. 6 Other courts have allowed amendments (or default judgments)
if the names looked substantially alike in print.7 Neither of those tests would
permit an amendment of the misnomer involved in the principal case, but it is
submitted that the type of service used (assuming now no defect in the method
of service itself) should be a factor in determining the effect of the misnomer. 8
Considering the particular misnomer with reference to the method of service
employed, the issue should be whether the defendant would reasonably conclude
that he was intended, or whether he would reasonably conclude that the serving
officer had simply made a mistake in identity. It could be argued that personal
service should be enough to give jurisdiction regardless of the appellation of the
defendant, but probably no court has gone that far. 9 Yet it would seem that if
in the principal case the sheriff had actually singled out James and personally
handed the papers to him, then James should be put on notice, and should
not be able safely to ignore the summons.10 On the opposite extreme, if service
by publication had been authorized and used, then the only notice available to
James would have been the language as it appeared in the publication. It is very
possible that he would never have seen it. Service by publication is the least
likely of all the methods of service to accomplish its purpose in fact, even when
there is no misnomer. There, at any rate, an error of Joseph for James would be
clearly fatal. 11 Substituted service is somewhere between personal and construe4 See 124 A.L.R. 86 (1940). When amendment is allowed it "relates back'' and the
statute of limitations is no defense.
5 The statute would have been satisfied, and very probably the sheriff's return would
have been in proper form. But even supposing the return contained an error, it would not
be considered fatal. 42 AM. Jtm., Process §§131-134 (1942).
6 That doctrine is that absolute accuracy in spelling names is not required; that if the
name as spelled conveys to the ear, when pronounced, a sound practically identical to the
correct name as commonly pronounced, then the name· is a sufficient designation. See
20 WoRDs AND PHRASES 8 (1940). The names "Davison" and "Davidson" were held
ulem sonans in Davison v. Banker's Life Assn., 166 Mo. App. 625, 150 S.W. 713 (1912).
7 Thus, an error of "Geilfuss" for "Guilfuss" was held not fatal in Ordean v. Grannis,
118 Minn. 117, 136 N.W. 575 (1912). The decision was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in 234 U.S. 385, 34 S.Ct. 779 (1914) against the defendant's due process
contention.
s See Coffman, "What's in a Name?" 14 NEB. L. REv. 343 (1936).
9 Note the language used in Jones v. U.P.R.R. Co., 84 Neb. 121, 120 N.W. 946 (1909).
10 However, the reported cases in the misnomer field indicate that the majority of courts
would probably disagree with this statement and with the statement in the principal case
at p. 750 that Joseph for James is a "slight misnomer." Cases are collected in 124 A.L.R.
86 (1940).
11 Butler v. Smith, 84 Neb. 78, 120 N.W. 1106 (1909) points out that in addition
to the fact that the defendant has not been singled out, publication of notice was unknown
to the common law. Therefore the publication statute will be strictly construed, and any
error will result in a failure of jurisdiction.
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tive service with respect to accomplishment of purpose. Substituted service might
reasonably be held to put the intended party on notice when the summons contains a name which is in fact the name of the party's brother. In such a case, it is
reasonable to suppose that the party would be tempted to read the complaint.
If it in tum set out facts in which the party realized he was involved, it may be
assumed that an inquiry would be made and a reasonable conclusion reached
that he himself was intended.12 The situation differs, in practical effect, when
a stranger is named. This same argument can be made where, as in the principal
case, the sheriff's return shows that the summons, though actually left at James'
domicile, was left as substituted service on Joseph. Nevertheless, the New Jersey
court is probably correct in safeguarding fundamental ideas of jurisdiction and
valid process.13 In fact, the formal rules of process are so well settled that, under
the facts involved, the court had little altemative.14

R. Lawrence Storms, S.Ed.

12 But cf. Baker v. Tormey, 209 Wis. 627, 245 N.W. 652 (1932) where intended
defendant's name was Weston Tormey, and the summons and complaint named Thomas
W. Tormey. Thomas was in fact the name of intended defendant's younger brother. Process
was left with the boys' mother at the family residence. A statute permitting the court upon
trial to amend misnomers was held inapplicable, and defendant was protected by the statute
of limitations.
13 However, the principal case affirms the amendment of the complaint on the grounds
that the defendant was not prejudiced; the case may be considered as one in which no process
has issued. The lower court on remand must decide whether the running of the statute of
limitations has been stopped. Thus the same result may be reached as though the service
had been good and the amendment of the summons had been allowed.
14 See 42 AM. Jun., Process §1-156 (1942). The necessity of service or a waiver
thereof is not dispensed with by the mere fact that a defendant may have learned in some
way of the filing of the suit. Piggly-Wiggly Georgia Co. v. May Investing Corp., 189 Ga.
477, 6 S.E. (2d) 579 (1939).

